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A significant amount of non-compliance associated with the personal income tax is due to the 
taxpayers who are not “in the system,” not having filed a tax return in the recent past or perhaps 
ever.  We use experimental laboratory methods to examine two types of positive incentives for 
filing tax returns: tax credits and social safety net benefits, both of which are conditional on tax 
filing.  Our experimental design captures the essential features of the voluntary income reporting 
and tax assessment system used in many countries.  Human participants in a controlled 
laboratory environment earn income through their performance in a task.  The participants must 
then decide whether to file a tax return and, conditional upon filing, how much income to report.  
Taxes are paid on reported income only.  Unreported income of filers may be discovered via a 
random audit, and the participant must then pay the owed taxes plus a fine based on the unpaid 
taxes; non-filers are not subject to an audit.  Inducements for filing are introduced in several 
alternative treatments.  In one treatment we introduce a social safety net (e.g., unemployment 
replacement income) that is conditional on past filing behavior.  In a second treatment we 
introduce tax credits that are available either to low income participants or to all income levels, 
but again only to those who file a tax return.  Our results suggest that a tax credit increases filing 
but only if the credit is targeted to low income earners.  The provision of a social safety net via 




* The research reported here was funded by the IRS (TIRNO – 07 – P – 00683).  The views 
expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of the IRS or of any researchers 
working within the IRS.   Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 IRS Research 
Conference (under the title “Encouraging Filing via Tax Credits and Social Safety Nets”) and at 
the Workshop “Beyond the Economics of Crime” at the University of Heidelberg in March 2009 
(under the title “Investigating the Impact of Positive Inducements on Voluntary Tax 
Compliance”).  We are grateful to Kim Bloomquist, to participants at the 2008 IRS Research 
Conference, and to participants at “Beyond the Economics of Crime”, especially Jean-Robert 
Tyran, for many helpful discussions and comments.   2
I. Introduction 
A significant amount of non-compliance associated with the individual income tax in 
most countries around the world is due to the taxpayers who are not “in the system,” not having 
filed a tax return in the recent past or perhaps ever.  Indeed, the compliance process in most 
countries is almost always tied to the existence of a tax return, which makes non-filing especially 
attractive because it avoids the financial burden of paying taxes and it simultaneously reduces the 
probability of detection, sometimes to zero.  Cowell (1990) and Erard and Ho (2001) have 
referred to those who do not file as “ghosts”.  This phenomenon is most prevalent among low to 
middle income citizens who are often “under the radar” of the tax authority because they receive 
income not subject to third-party withholding.
1  While the amounts owed by such taxpayers on 
their incomes are often individually small, the aggregate amount contributes substantially to the 
tax gap.
2  A problem facing policy makers is encouraging these taxpayers to join the system.  
The payoff to the tax agency from such inclusion may be very high, and evidence suggests that 
once taxpayers initially file a tax return they continue to do so in the future.  Because non-filing 
also introduces inefficiencies in resource allocation and inequities between those who pay taxes 
and similarly situated individuals who successfully cheat, finding ways to encourage filing also 
has payoffs to society.  Encouraging filing can be accomplished either through negative 
incentives (e.g., detection and punishment) or through positive incentives (e.g., the receipt of 
                                                 
1 Another class of non-filers is represented by those earning income through illegal activities who choose not to 
report such activities.  The policy instruments that we investigate here are not designed to address this class of 
behavior.  However, it is interesting to note that failing to pay tax on income from illegal activities can compound 
the penalties and increase the probability of detection since an additional crime is being committed.  In some 
countries like Canada, the tax agency is precluded from reporting illegal activity to other law enforcement agencies, 
and it is not uncommon for marijuana growers in Canada to file tax returns on the income from this activity. 
2 Income taxes not reported and paid by non-filers in the U.S. were estimated at $27 billion for tax year 2001, out of 
a total “tax gap” of $345 billion. See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf .  In many other 
countries, especially developing countries, non-filing is even more significant.   3
payments that are conditional upon filing a return).  In this paper, we examine the effectiveness 
of positive inducements in the individual tax filing decision. 
There are several potential avenues in the tax system for encouraging participation via tax 
filing.  One prominent class of policies encouraging tax participation is the receipt of direct 
benefits under various income transfer programs and public sector pensions for which all citizens 
are eligible.  Included here are programs broadly classified as social insurance programs.  The 
receipt of benefits associated with these programs can be used to encourage tax filing since being 
“in the system” may be a condition for eligibility. 
  The use of tax credits to affect participation is a more targeted approach.  These programs 
often provide targeted tax credits conditional upon filing, which thereby create incentives for 
individuals to participate in the tax system; at the same time the costs of participation must be 
minimized, so that such programs must pass the test of being administratively simple for the 
taxpayer.  The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a prominent example of this program type.  
The provisions of the EITC restrict participation to relatively low income earners, with the lion’s 
share of benefits going to families with children.  The EITC is somewhat complicated, and this 
feature has probably led to lower participation.
3  A significant percentage of EITC participants 
would be outside the tax system in the absence of the program.  However, audit procedures under 
the program impose an additional cost (both economic and psychological) on participants, which 
may have reduced participation among this class of taxpayers; indeed, there has been targeted 
                                                 
3 This may be a factor leading to the estimates of Erard and Ho (2001) that 29 percent of the non-filers may have 
been entitled to get money back were they to file.  They also argue that EITC-eligible individuals are over-
represented among non-filers.   4
auditing of those filing for the credit.  The child care expense tax credit is another example of a 
targeted tax credit that encourages filing.
4 
The difficulty in assessing the effects of such policies is the obvious one: any such effects 
depend on the behavioral responses of individuals currently not filing tax returns and so not 
currently observable by the tax authority.  Indeed, studies of non-filing using field data are not 
numerous.  While compliance behavior is difficult to observe in the field, non-filing is even more 
hidden.  Crain and Nourzad (1993) compared the characteristics of those who evade while filing 
versus those who choose simply to not file.  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Graecher, 
Nichols, and Sparrow, 1992) has also conducted studies of delinquent returns to ascertain factors 
specific to non-filers.  In the most detailed and comprehensive study of non-filing, Erard and Ho 
(2001) use IRS information to estimate the factors that affect non-filing.
5 
As with all studies based on field data, however, these studies suffer from not having 
direct measures of noncompliance (e.g., the use of reported income, not unreported income), 
from being forced to contend with various econometric issues (e.g., the endogeneity of audit 
selection arising from budgets for audit activities), and from the inability to control for all 
                                                 
4  There also exist other policies that may increase compliance and participation.  Anxiety reduction for potential 
taxpayers as they approach the tax agency (i.e. emphasizing a “kinder, gentler, tax agency”) may increase 
compliance and participation.  Research has shown that taxpayers respond to positive inducements to comply (Alm, 
Jackson, and McKee, 1992), but there may be consequences of such positive inducements on initially compliant 
taxpayers.  Tax amnesties can be an effective means of allowing taxpayers to “wipe the slate clean” if they have 
evaded taxes in the past (Alm, McKee, and Beck, 1990).  Similarly, perceptions of fairness have a significant effect 
on individual decisions (Cherry and Shogren, 2008).  Also, some current tax policies often permit individuals to 
claim losses from some classes of earnings (e.g., capital gains, self-employment income) against income taxes 
imposed on other wage and salary income, but only if the individual files a  tax return.  While these policies are 
typically understood as focusing on higher income taxpayers, the programs also affect middle and low income 
taxpayers and those working outside the purview of the tax authority (e.g., individuals with part-time self-
employment or with cash only businesses).  Provided an individual has taxable income from wages and salaries, he 
or she can benefit from the use of offsets.  Indeed, the presence of loss offsets may encourage individuals to 
undertake entrepreneurial activities involving some risk of incurring losses. “Social norms” may also affect tax 
compliance.  There has been work in this area, and the results suggest that such motives can have a positive effect on 
compliance.  Even so, there has been little literature on filing itself.  See, for example, Cummings, Martinez-
Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler (2009). 
5  See Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1991) for analysis of non-filing in Jamaica.   5
variables that might affect taxpayer reporting decisions (e.g., changes in the tax laws, taxpayer 
attitudes, economic conditions).  Further, there are few changes in the rules for tax credits and/or 
income support programs, and such changes as do occur are often confounded with other effects 
such as changes in macroeconomic conditions.
6 
Since it is the behavioral responses of individuals whom the tax authority cannot directly 
observe that are of interest, the laboratory is a natural arena to investigate the effects of policies 
aimed at increasing tax participation.  Although there are numerous experimental studies that 
examine behavioral responses of those individuals who already file a tax return (Becker, 
Buchner, and Sleeking, 1987; Webley et al. 1991; Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992; Alm, 
Jackson, and McKee, 1993; Gerxhani and Schram, 2006; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, 
McKee, and Torgler, 2009), there are no experimental analyses of filing inducements, in which 
subjects have the option to file or not to file a tax return. 
  Accordingly, our research here is directed at assessing the effects on filing of reinforcing 
recognition of the the social insurance aspect of the fiscal system and of providing tax credits, 
either of which is received only if the taxpayer files a return.  To examine these issues, we 
introduce in a controlled laboratory setting various filing inducements, including social safety 
nets and tax credits. 
Our experimental design captures the essential features of the voluntary income reporting 
and tax assessment system used in many countries.  Human participants in a controlled 
laboratory environment earn income, must decide whether to file and, conditional upon filing, 
how much of this income to report to a tax agency.  Taxes are paid on reported income only.  
                                                 
6  Some quasi-natural experiments have been conducted.  For example, the introduction of the EITC has provided an 
opportunity to observe changes in the characteristics of filers.  Scholz (1994) uses 1990 Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) data, and finds that the participation rate for the EITC is between 80 and 86 percent 
Most recently one could study the effects of the Bush Administration “stimulus package” tax rebate checks on the 
filing behavior of citizens, although those data are not yet available.     6
Unreported income may be discovered via a random audit, and the participant must then pay the 
owed taxes plus a fine based on the unpaid taxes.  However, only individuals who file a return 
and are “in the system” may be selected for audit; non-filers are not subject to an audit.
7   
Positive inducements for filing are introduced in several alternative treatments.  In one treatment 
we introduce a social safety net (e.g., unemployment replacement income) that is conditional 
upon past filing behavior.  In a second treatment we introduce tax credits that are available either 
to low income participants or to all income levels, but again only to those who file a tax return.   
We find that an untargeted tax credit does not influence participation, but targeting the credit to 
low income earners increases filing.  We also find that the provision of a social safety net via 
unemployment benefits has a positive, albeit indirect, impact on participation. 
In the next section we discuss the theory underlying the filing (and reporting) decision.  
We then present our experimental design, followed by the experimental results.  We conclude in 
the final section. 
 
II. The Filing versus the Reporting Decision 
The traditional theoretical development of the reporting decision typically begins with 
the assumption that the individual has already chosen to file a return.  Following Becker (1968), 
evasion is then modeled as a gamble in which the states of nature are being caught or not being 
caught, where if caught a fine is assessed (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974).  The 
individual decides only the amount of income to report and so the amount to evade, and a 
rational individual is viewed as maximizing the expected utility of the tax evasion gamble, 
                                                 
7 The audit probability for non-filers is set at zero in these experiments.  In the field the rate is not zero but is 
effectively very close to zero.  In the US the IRS may conduct audits of non-filers based on tips, “lifestyle audits” in 
which visible expenditures are a flag for an audit, or through passive income sources such as deposit interest.  Since 
the frequency is very low, we elected to implement a zero audit probability in the lab setting.    7
weighing the benefits of successful cheating against the risky prospect of detection and 
punishment.  The individual reports income and pays taxes because he or she is afraid of getting 
caught and penalized if he or she does not report all income.  This approach gives the plausible 
and productive result that compliance depends upon audit rates and fine rates.  Indeed, the 
central point of this approach is that an individual pays taxes because – and only because – of 
this fear of detection and punishment.
8 
As noted earlier, this decision has been extensively investigated using field and lab data.
9  
For those who file, the traditional recipe of increased audits and/or increased penalties is the 
recommended policy for increasing compliance, subject to the taxpayers’ awareness of the 
enforcement effort increase (Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 2009). 
Of perhaps more interest is the issue of the filing decision.  To the extent that non-filers 
persons are not “in the system” and so face little or no risk of being selected for audit, the 
traditional policy response of increased enforcement efforts is not effective.
10  Indeed, the 
traditional Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) analyses of the reporting decision 
do not fully capture the elements of the individual’s filing decision because submitting a tax 
return with underreported liabilities is inherently different from failing to submit a return at all.  
Evasion while reporting raises the specter of an audit since the tax return is “in the system”; a 
return that has not been filed may be exposed to a much lower risk of audit.  However, if the 
individual who has not filed a return is detected as having not filed, there may be additional 
penalties; see Erard and Ho (2001) for a description.  The tradeoff is a lower probability of 
                                                 
8  See Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Alm (1999), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for 
comprehensive surveys and discussions of this literature. 
9  Again, see Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Alm (1999), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). 
10  Most audit schemes are based on factors that are reported on tax returns and that past audit results indicate are 
associated with large amounts of unreported income (e.g., the Internal Revenue Service use of a “DIF” score).  
Individuals who do not file a return are obviously not at risk of audit from such audit schemes.   8
detection for non-filing versus a higher penalty for detected non-filing.  For this filing decision, 
the individual must compare the expected utility from filing versus the expected utility from non-
filing, where an individual who files must also then determine the amount of income to report on 
the return. 
Erard and Ho (2001) expand the traditional model to include both of these filing and 
reporting compliance decisions.  They construct a sequential decision that includes such steps as 
the choice of income withholding, the decision to file, and the reporting decision.  The 
framework is an extension of the typical “gamble” model of evasion, but incorporates the more 
realistic setting that reflects the true decision setting of the taxpayer.  In their framework, the 
decision to file or not is influenced by the costs of filing, the probability of being identified as a 
non-filer, and the penalties for not filing.  To these, one should also incorporate the potential 
benefits from such tax credits as may exist (e.g., the EITC) and/or the existence of a social safety 
net (where the benefits may be uncertain), both of which may be conditional on prior tax 
filings.
11  Both the tax credit and the expected value of the social safety net represent positive 
inducements to file. 
To see how these may enter the individual’s calculus, we modify the Erard and Ho (2000) 
framework.   In the absence of tax credits or income support programs, an individual who 
decides to file a tax return and report income has expected utility equal to: 
 
(1) Filing:      (1-p) U(Y-tX-c) + p U(Y-tX-(1+f)t(Y-X)-c), 
 
 
where p is the probability that a tax return is audited, Y is the individual’s “true” income, X is the 
amount of reported income, t is the tax rate on declared income, f is the penalty rate on 
                                                 
11 Further factors that may affect filing decisions include social norms.  There has been work in this area, and the 
results suggest that such motives can have a positive effect on compliance.  Even so, there has been little literature 
on filing itself.  See Gerhanxi and Schram (2006) and Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler (2007).   9
undeclared taxes, c is the burden of preparing and filing a tax return, and U( ) is the utility 
function.  Expected utility in equation (1) equals the expected utility if the individual files a tax 
return at cost c, declares income X, pays taxes tX, and is not audited, or (1-p) U(Y-tX-c), plus the 
expected utility if the individual is caught and is forced to pay all taxes on undeclared income, or 
p U(Y-tX-(1+f)t(Y-X)-c).  The individual chooses the amount of reported income to maximize 
expected utility. 
We modify this equation to introduce a tax credit or an income support program: 
 
(1)’  Filing – Tax Credit:    (1-p) U(Y-tX+CR-c) + p U(Y-tX+CR-(1+f)t(Y-X)-c), 
 
(1)’’  Filing – Income Support:  (1-p) U(Y-tX+E(IS)-c) + p U(Y-tX+E(IS)-(1+f)t(Y-X)-c). 
 
 
In equation (1)’, the individual receives a tax credit whose (fixed) value is CR and whose receipt 
is conditional upon filing (and whose magnitude may vary with income).  In equation (1)’’, an 
individual who has been previously unemployed and who files a tax return is eligible for income 
support IS whose expected value is E(IS), where E( ) is the expectation operator; as with the tax 
credit, receipt of income support is conditional upon filing.  In both cases, the individual must 
still choose the amount of reported income X to maximize expected utility.  An individual who 
chooses not to file a tax return (and so who declares no income) has expected utility equal to: 
 
(2) Non-filing:      (1-q) U(Y) + q U(Y-(1+f)tY-c). 
 
 
Here q is the probability (possibly equal to zero) that an individual who has not filed a return is 
apprehended by an audit.  The individual compares the value of expected utility from filing and 
reporting the optimal amount of income in the relevant case of equations (1), (1)’, or (1)’’, with 
expected utility if the individual decides not to file a tax return.   10
It is clear that an increase in the tax credit or in the level of income support increases the 
return to filing a tax return, other things equal.  Other variables (e.g., the tax rate t, the fine rate f) 
have more complicated effects.   It is the positive inducements for filing from tax credits and 
income support programs that our experimental design investigates. 
 
III. Experimental Design  
The experimental design captures the essential features of the voluntary income reporting 
and tax assessment system used in many countries.
12  Human participants in a controlled 
laboratory environment earn income through their performance in a task.  The participants must 
decide first whether to file a tax return and then, conditional upon filing a return, how much of 
this income to report to a tax agency.  Taxes are paid on reported income only.  If an individual 
files a return, any unreported income may be discovered via a random audit, and the individual 
must then pay the owed taxes plus a fine based on the unpaid taxes.
13  The probability of 
detection if the individual does not file is set at zero, to reflect the fact in most countries that an 
individual who does not file faces effectively no chance of detection.  Subjects are fully and 
accurately informed about the various features of the experimental setting (e.g., tax rates, penalty 
rates, audit rates, tax form costs, tax credits, unemployment benefits, and the like).  This income 
earning, income reporting, audit, and penalty process is repeated over a number of rounds each 
                                                 
12  The full set of experimental instructions is available upon request. 
13  It may be argued that current audit practice in many countries also implements endogenous audits, since a 
taxpayer either elicits an audit or not depending on his or her “score” in an audit rule.  However, whether a taxpayer 
is actually audited depends both on the score and on the audit budget of the tax authority.  Since the taxpayer cannot 
know this latter item with certainty, there remains a random component to the audit process.  See Alm and McKee 
(2004) for an experimental examination of this type of endogenous audit selection rule.   11
representing a tax period.  At the completion of the experiment, all participants are paid in cash 
their laboratory market earnings converted to U.S. dollars.
14 
  Participants are recruited from the pool of undergraduate students and staff at a major 
public university.
15  Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participants are assigned to a computer 
station with each station being situated in an isolation carrel.  The lab server assigns participants 
to groups (consisting of seven to ten persons depending on the total number of participants in the 
session) and there are always two groups in a session to implement anonymity.  The instructions 
are provided via a series of screen images.  There is no interaction or communication between 
the participants; also, there is virtually no interaction between the participants and the person 
running the experiment.  All decisions are made privately, and participants are not allowed to 
communicate with one another during the session.  Also, the participants are informed (via the 
consent sheet) that all responses are anonymous, that no individual identification will be 
collected, and that the only record of participation will be the receipt form signed to receive 
payment at the end of the session.  Subjects do not sign consent forms to further increase their 
anonymity.  Participants are told, via the instructions, that payments will be made in private at 
the end of the session and that all responses are anonymous. 
                                                 
14 These experiments are designed to inform policy makers, and so must satisfy Smith’s (1982) precept of 
“parallelism”.  Parallelism is satisfied when the experimental setting captures the essential elements of the decision 
problem faced in the naturally occurring setting.  It is neither necessary nor desirable that the experimental setting 
implement all of the complexity of the naturally occurring setting (Plott, 1987).  As implemented, our experimental 
design follows the elements of much of the earlier research (e.g., Becker, Buchner, and Sleeking, 1987; Alm, 
Jackson, and McKee, 1992; 1993), but incorporates additional features to improve parallelism with taxpayers’ 
decision making in the naturally occurring world.  Participants earn income by performing a task (rather than 
receiving an endowment), they must choose how much income to report, and they face an audit process similar to 
that in the naturally occurring setting.  Importantly, participants must choose whether or not to file a return.  The 
experiments utilize tax language in the instructions and computer interface.  While the stakes are small, the decision 
is also simplified, implying that the ratio of decision costs and rewards parallels the naturally occurring setting 
(Smith and Walker, 1993). 
15 Recruiting was conducted using the Online Recruiting System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) developed 
by Greiner (2004).  The participant database was built using announcements sent via email to students and staff.  
Participants were contacted via email, and were permitted to participate in only one tax experiment, although other 
experimental projects were ongoing at the time and participants may have participated in other types of experiments.    12
Taken together, these experimental procedures implement the properties of a double blind 
design.  The lack of subject-to-subject interaction implements a single blind setting.
16  The lack 
of subject-to-experimenter interaction, the strictly imposed subject anonymity through the 
computer interface, and the private payment mechanism to subjects implement a double blind 
design between the subject and experimenter. 
Participants are not told the exact duration of the experimental session, which is 
predetermined to last for 20 real rounds (together with 3 practice rounds).  Sessions take on 
average 70 minutes to complete.  Participant earnings range from $14 to $38, depending upon 
task earnings, filing and reporting behavior, and audit experience.
17   
  The earnings task requires the participants to sort the digits 1 through 9 into the correct 
ascending order from a randomized order presented in a 3 by 3 matrix (see Appendix A, Figure 
A-1).  Participants do this by pointing the computer mouse and “clicking” on the numbers in the 
correct sequence.  A 3 by 3 matrix with the digits in random order first appears on the right side 
of each subject’s computer screen; as the numbers are “clicked”, they then appear in a 3 by 3 
matrix on the left side of the screen.  A counter on the screen shows the elapsed time from when 
the first number is “clicked” and also when all nine numbers have been ordered, and the 
participant clicks the “Continue” button to transmit this time to the server.  Actual income is 
determined by the relative speed of performance, with the fastest performer receiving the highest 
income and the slowest performer receiving the lowest income.  Once all participants have 
completed the income task, they are informed via the computer of their income for the round and 
                                                 
16  As discussed later, subject anonymity is also implemented via our use of a computerized draw from a “bingo 
cage”.   Use of a computerized bingo cage means that subjects do not know who, if anyone, is audited and that 
subjects also do not know the outcome of any audit.  In some previous experimental work, a mechanical random 
draw device has been used.  However, to make this draw credible to subjects, the results of the draw must be 
announced, and doing so means that the subjects learn if someone is audited, which violates the precepts of a double 
blind design. 
17 The exchange rate for sessions with staff participants was set to yield payments commensurate with their outside 
earnings, an adjustment that involved halving the exchange rate between lab dollars and U.S. dollars.    13
presented with a screen that provides the details of the policy in effect, where they are informed 
of the tax rate, the audit probability, and the penalty rate on discovered evasion (see Appendix A, 
Figure A-2). 
For the credit treatments, the participants are informed of the level of the tax credit they 
are eligible to receive and that receipt of this amount is conditional upon filing a tax return (and 
upon the level of income that is reported).  For the income support (or unemployment benefit) 
treatments, the participants are informed of the probability of being unemployed, the duration of 
unemployment, and the income support they are eligible to receive; again, they are told that 
receipt is conditional upon filing and upon the level of income that is reported.  The 
unemployment benefits are determined as follows.  The number of filing periods for eligibility is 
stated in the instructions, and the benefit is a stated percentage of the average of the incomes 
reported on filing during the periods required for eligibility. 
  The tax form is not provided at this point.  This simulates the need for the participant to 
collect information needed to file a return.  Participants may choose to get a form or not, where 
there may be a cost for the form (see Appendix A, Figure A-3).  If the participant chooses not to 
obtain a tax form, then they do not file and are not subject to an audit in the current round; this 
feature reflects the typical feature of tax systems that individuals who do not file a return and so 
who are not “in the system” effectively face a zero chance of audit.
18  If the participant chooses 
to get the form, then the cost, if there is one, is deducted from the participant’s income for the 
round.  Even if the participant obtains the form, he or she may still choose to not file by selecting 
the “Not File” button.  Since the tax filing season is limited in the field, there is a time limit 
                                                 
18  The participants are also not subject to a future audit on a report from a current round; that is, audits only review 
the current report.  In future work, we will impose a small but non-zero audit probability here to reflect the 
possibility that the individual may be detected through other transactions that may be subject to matching paperwork 
(e.g., bank interest earnings).   14
imposed (75 seconds), and a counter at the bottom of the tax form informs the participants of the 
time remaining.  If the time expires and a tax form has not been filed, then the participant is 
automatically audited and an additional 10 percent penalty is imposed.  See Appendix A, Figure 
A-4 for an example of the tax return. 
  At the end of the session, the participants complete a short questionnaire by reporting 
their age, gender, and whether they prepare and file their own taxes.  If they respond “No” to this 
last question, we assume that their parents are responsible for tax preparation, given that some of 
the participants are college sophomores, juniors, and seniors.
19 
  The process of determining who is audited is generated by a computerized draw.  After 
the return is filed, the participants are presented with an animated (computerized) representation 
of a bucket from which a draw is made.  In this bucket there are 10 blue and white balls in total, 
with a white ball signifying no audit and a blue ball denoting an audit.  Each taxpayer is audited 
independently.  The balls “bounce” in this bucket, and, after a randomly determined interval, a 
door opens and a ball exits the bucket through this door.  The color indicates whether the 
individual is audited.
20  Participants choosing not to file a tax return are presented with a screen 
that informs them that they will not be audited in the current round.  Subjects know only the 
result of their own audit process and not the results for the other subjects.  After the audit process 
has been completed, the taxpayers are presented a new screen that provides the earnings and 
audit outcome summary for the round. 
                                                 
19 Since these experiments utilize tax language, it is important to control for innate, or homegrown, values regarding 
tax compliance.   Based on previous experimental work, we have determined that the most immediate measure of 
these values would be obtained from individual experience in filing personal income taxes. 
20 This approach is similar to that used in some previous evasion studies (Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
McKee, 2006), but differs from Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1993) where a mechanical bingo cage was used.  A 
computerized draw has the advantage of increasing the degree of anonymity among the subjects since it is 
impossible for a subject to observe the audit experience of other subjects.  This anonymity is more difficult to 
implement if a mechanical device (such as a bingo cage or urn) is used.      15
Our objective is to examine the effects of positive inducements to file a tax return.   The 
basic programs are outlined in Table 1.  Our focus is on the use of tax credits and on the income 
protection offered through unemployment benefits.  To establish a baseline, we conduct sessions 
in which these inducements are absent, but the other features of the tax filing regime are 
incorporated.  The no-inducement treatments (denoted “NI”) are described in Table 2.  The tax 
rate is set at 35 percent throughout all sessions, and the audit probabilities are set at 0.3 or 0.4 
with two values in use in each session.  The rate is set for the first 8 rounds, changes for the 
second 8 rounds, and reverts to the original level for the final 4 rounds.  Thus, in Table 2, the 
audit rates for NI are 0.4 for 8 rounds, 0.3 for 8 rounds, and 0.4 for the final 4 rounds.  
Participants are instructed that the rate may change during the course of the session, but they are 
not told the specific pattern.  In all cases, the on-screen bingo cage shows the audit rate as the 
number of blue balls of the 10 white and blue balls in the cage. 
 
Table 1 – General Treatment Design for Investigation of Inducements to File 
Treatment Sample  Parameters 
No Positive Inducement   Cost of Tax Form and Probability of Audit 
Refundable Tax Credit  Conditional on Low Income  Available to All Income Levels 
Income (Employment) Risk  Support: Moderate Percentage 
of Previous Income 




In all sessions the subjects must obtain the tax form.  The cost of the form ranges from 
zero to two lab dollars, and this information is presented at the time the choice of whether to 
obtain the form is being made.   The tax form cost in the experiment represents the overall costs 
of filing incurred, in addition to the cognitive cost of simply completing the form. 
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NI  35%  0.4, 0.3, 0.4  150%  15%  10 to 100  2, 1, 0 
Notes: The “Income Range” is 10 (“Low”) to 100 (“High”), with increments of 10 and with1 
person per level. 
 
 
The first set of filing inducements consists of tax credits targeted at lower income 
taxpayers.  This targeting is typically motivated by equity concerns, but it has the collateral 
effect of addressing a specific set of “ghosts”, or those with lower incomes who may well be 
earning incomes that are not matched by employer records submitted to the tax authority.
21  The 
basic tax credit settings are shown in Table 3 as CT1 and CT2, where “CT” denotes “Credit 
Treatment” and where the key difference between these treatments is the targeting of the income 
tax credit to lower income earners in CT2.  
 
 








CT1  10 – 100  2, 1, 0  0.3, 0.4, 0.3  CR = 20 – 0.2*I 
(Income Tax Credit) 
CT2  10 – 100  2, 1, 0  0.3, 0.4, 0.3  CR = 30 – 0.6*I 
(Low Income Tax Credit) 
 Notes: The “Income Range” is 10 (“Low”) to 100 (“High”), with increments of 10 and with1 
person per level.  The credit equation reports the intercept (e.g., the base credit) and the reduction 
in the credit as income increases.  For example, if CR = 20 – 0.2*I (“Income Tax Credit”), then 
the base credit is 20 lab dollars; if the participant earns, say, 60 lab dollars,  then the credit is 8 
lab dollars; the credit goes to zero at 100 lab dollars, which is the maximum income level 
possible.  In the “Low Income Tax Credit” setting, the base credit is set at 30 lab dollars, and the 
credit drops to zero when the participant has earned 50 lab dollars. 
 
 
The other inducement investigated here is the presence of an income support program 
that pays benefits in the event of the individual becoming unemployed.  Payment of benefits is 
                                                 
21 Alm, Deskins, and McKee (2009) investigate the filing behavior of individuals earning income not subject to the 
type of matching paperwork usually associated with formal sector earnings.     17
conditional on the previous filing history of the individual.  Specifically, benefit payouts are 
computed as a stated percentage of average income filed in previous periods.  The parameters in 
effect for this series of sessions are shown in Table 4, where “UT” denotes “Unemployment 
Treatment”.  Audit probabilities and cost of the tax form are set at levels in the baseline and 
credit treatments so that we can focus on policy parameters specific to the unemployment 
benefits program and on the effect of risk of becoming unemployed.  Thus, in Table 4 we 
introduce as treatments the percentage of the income that will be replaced by the unemployment 
benefits; in both cases, the number of required filing periods is 2. 
During the periods of unemployment, the participant does not have the opportunity to 
earn income (the income earning task screen is suppressed).  Instead, subjects are presented a 
screen informing them that they are unemployed and that this is round x of unemployment period 
of duration y; see Appendix A, Figure A-5.  The unemployment benefits in our setting are 
taxable.  Thus, the participants are presented a screen informing them of the unemployment 
benefits (if any) that they will receive in the current round and of the opportunity to obtain a tax 
form or not.  If the participant files a tax return reporting their unemployment benefit income, 
then they are subject to the normal audit process.  If the participant chooses to not file, then they 















UT1  2, 1, 0  0.3, 0.4, 0.3  0.4 and 0.2  0.5  2 
UT2  2, 1, 0  0.3, 0.4, 0.3  0.4  0.6  2 
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With the exception of CT1, the positive inducements applied here are intended to target 
lower income taxpayers.  In CT2 (“Low Income Tax Credit”), the tax credits apply to 50 to 90 
percent of the income earners; in both UT1 and UT2, the unemployment benefit safety net pays 
out 50 to 60 percent of average earnings.  (In “Income Tax Credit” CT1, all income levels are 
eligible for a credit.)  Because of this targeting, the net tax yield from the participants in all of 
these settings is quite small when the proposed programs are implemented.  For the settings in 
which there are 10 participants in a group (the typical case) and the income distribution ranges 
from a high of 100 lab dollars to a low of 10 lab dollars, total income is 550 lab dollars; at a tax 
rate of 35 percent applied to the net of deduction (15 percent) income, the tax yield for full 
compliance is 110 lab dollars per round.  By way of comparison, the per-round cost of the 
Income Tax Credit of CT1 is 90 lab dollars, and the per-round cost of the Low Income Tax 
Credit of CT2 is 60 lab dollars; for the social safety net (unemployment insurance), there is an 
expected cost under full compliance and filing of 90 lab dollars.  Thus, the net yield to the tax 
authority is generally small.  Nevertheless, the objective is to increase filing, and it is this 
behavior that we analyze here. 
  Our hypothesis is that filing will increase under the inducements offered by the tax credit 
and the social safety net provisions.  The next section presents and discusses our results. 
 
IV. Results and Discussion 
A total of 338 subjects participated in 24 sessions, each lasting between 18 and 20 
rounds, yielding 4,424 observations.  Table 5 reports the means and standard deviations of the 
variables used in the analysis.  The experimental design entails the following treatment variables: 
the cost of obtaining the tax form (Form Cost), the Audit Probability, the opportunity to claim a   19
credit (Income Tax Credit), the opportunity to claim a low income credit (Low Income Tax 
Credit), and the availability of unemployment benefits (Unemployment Benefits).  Observed 
outcomes include the subject’s earned income (Income), whether the subject purchased the tax 
form (Form Bought), and whether the subject filed the form (Form Filed).  Subjects averaged 
29.8 years of Age (the range being ages 18 to 71), and 41 percent were male (Sex).  The typical 
participant earned nearly 50 lab dollars per round, bought a tax form about 70 percent of the 
time, and filed the form nearly 68 percent of the time.   
 
 
Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Form Cost (lab$)  0.566  0.779 
Audit Probability  0.349  0.056 
Income Tax Credit (Yes=1)  0.503  0.500 
Low Income Tax Credit (Yes=1)  0.298  0.458 
Unemployment Benefits (Yes=1)  0.353  0.478 
Form Bought (Yes=1)  0.704  0.457 
Form Filed (Yes=1)  0.675  0.468 
Income (lab$)  49.846  31.458 
Age (Years)  29.807  13.572 
Sex (Male=1)  0.410  0.492 
 
 
Table 6 summarizes subject/taxpayer behavior by treatment.  These aggregate numbers 
suggest three main results.  First, the presence of a general tax credit does not alter the rate that 
subjects obtain and file forms.  The frequencies of obtaining and filing forms are essentially the 
same across the No Inducement and the general Income Tax Credit treatments (or 0.676 versus 
0.673 and 0.652 versus 0.640).
22  Second, a targeted low income credit increases the frequencies 
                                                 
22  Note that the frequency of filing is quite high, even in the No Inducement settings in which the incentive to file a 
return is not present.  This high filing rate may be due in part to such factors as “obedience to authority” (Cadsby, 
Maynes, and Trivedi, 2006) or as “pro-social behavior” (Levitt and List, 2006).  Indeed, it is common in many 
experimental studies for subjects to behave in more cooperative and less individualistic ways than predicted by the 
theory; again, see Cadsby, Maynes, and Trivedi (2006) and Levitt and List (2006) for numerous examples.  Even so,   20
of obtaining and filing forms.  Rates of each are over five percentage points greater in the Low 
Income Tax Credit treatments than in the No Inducement baseline.  Third, the presence of 
unemployment benefits provides an even larger positive impact on filing behavior.  The 
frequencies of obtaining and filing forms are nearly 18 percentage points greater than the rates 
observed without any inducement, and are over 10 percentage points greater than the case of a 
low income tax credit. 
 
 
Table 6 – Frequency of Form Bought and Form Filed by Treatment Variable 




















Notes: The top number in each cell reports the percentage of subjects obtaining/filing form, and 
the number in parentheses reports the standard deviation. 
 
 
Some of these results warrant discussion.  First, a substantial number of participants file a 
tax return even when there is clearly no incentive.  In the “No Inducement” setting 65% of the 
participants file a return.  This is consistent with similar observations in the field, in which many 
individuals disclose income although the probability of detection via an audit is extremely low 
and tax compliance can only be explained by either extreme forms of risk aversion (Bernasconi, 
1998) or the presence of different “types” of individuals in the population (Bloomquist, 2009) 
some of whom are innately compliant and others innately non-compliant.  Since the participants 
                                                                                                                                                             
as argued by Alm (1991), what is of more interest in the experimental analysis of compliance is not so much the 
levels of filing compliance but the changes in this behavior, as reflected in the responses of the subjects to changes 
in the incentives to file.   21
in these experiments know with certainty they will not be audited if they do not file a tax return, 
we must be observing a base level of innate compliance.  In any experiment the key observation 
is the differential behavior that accompanies the introduction of treatment effects.  In Table 6 we 
observe that the filing frequency increases under the targeted tax credit and the presence of social 
safety nets but not the general tax credit. 
To confirm these initial impressions from the aggregate data, we conduct a conditional 
analysis at the individual level that estimates treatment effects while holding other factors 
constant.  We estimate the following empirical model: 
 
(3)  Ti,t = β1 + β2Pi,t +β3Ii,t + β4p(A)i,t + β5Ci  + β6UBi  + β7LUBi,t-2 + β8Di + ψt + ui + εi,t, 
 
 
where the dependent variable Ti,t denotes  subject i’s decision to obtain or to file a tax form in 
period t; Pi,t is the price subject i must pay to obtain a tax form in period t; Ii is subject i’s earned 
income in period t; p(A)i,t is the audit probability for subject i in period t; Ci and UBi  are 
indicator variables that signify the presence of a tax credit and unemployment benefits for 
subject i; LUBi,t-2 is an indicator variable that signifies that subject i received unemployment 
benefits two periods prior
23; Di is a vector of demographic variables (e.g., subject age and sex); 
ψt is a set of T-1 dummies that capture potential non-linear period effects; ui are random effects 
that control for unobservable individual characteristics
24; εi,t is the contemporaneous additive 
error term; and βk is the coefficient for variable k.  We also include interaction variables between 
income and credit for subject i in time t. 
From this specification, we estimate a model of obtaining a tax form (Ti,t = 1 if the form 
is bought and 0 otherwise) and a model of filing a tax form (Ti,t = 1 if the form is filed and 0 
                                                 
23 Note that the introduction of a lagged variable reduces the number of observations in the analysis. 
24 Given the between subject design of key treatment variables, we must utilize a random effects specification to 
control for subject heterogeneity.    22
otherwise).  For each, we estimate equation (3) using both a linear probability model and a probit 
specification, in each case controlling for subject heterogeneity and time period effects.
25  These 
estimates are presented in Table 7. 
The conditional estimates in Table 7 corroborate our initial impressions discussed above.   
The presence of tax credits and social safety nets (here, unemployment benefits) clearly 
encourages individual tax filing.  Tax credits are effective only when targeted to low income 
individuals.  As suggested by the aggregate data, the general Income Tax Credit does not 
significantly influence the fraction of individuals deciding to obtain or file a tax form.  However, 
when the credit is targeted to low income earners, the Low Income Tax Credit has a highly 
significant effect on increasing compliance (p<0.01).  As in many other instances, targeted 
programs yield superior results.  Estimated coefficients on the interaction terms indicate that this 
positive impact diminishes with income, a result consistent with expectations because the credit 
is targeted to lower income participants and any impact from the credit will be negatively 
correlated with income.   
The mere presence of an unemployment benefits program does not appear to increase 
filing.  However, an indirect effect arises from increased filing by individuals receiving benefits 
in the past.  Our estimation results indicate that the presence of unemployment benefits has no 
significant impact on compliance behavior but that, after receiving benefits, individuals are 
significantly more likely to obtain and file tax forms (p<0.01).  We apply a two period lag to the 
receipt of unemployment benefits since this is the duration of unemployment.  After two periods, 
the individual is earning income (employed) and we are interested in whether the likelihood of 
filing from such income is affected by the unemployment benefits program (safety net).  
                                                 
25A random effects specification is also available in a logit model, and we have estimated a logit specification.  Our 
results are similar across both probit and logit procedures.  Likelihood ratio tests indicate the need to control for 
subject heterogeneity in all models (p<0.01), while tests indicate the significance of period effects are marginal.   23
 
Table 7 – Estimation Results 
  Linear Model    Probit Model   
Independent Variable  Form Filed  Form Bought  Form Filed   Form Bought 
Constant 0.554***  0  .723***  -0.005  0.706* 
 (0.0848)  (0.0881)  (0.4047) (0.4379) 
Form Cost       --  -0.074***       --  -0.319** 
   (0.0314)   (0.1521) 
Income  0.001*** 0.001***  0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Audit  Probability  0.018 0.109  0.084 0.470 
 (0.1361)  (0.1333)  (0.6278) (0.6369) 
Income  Tax  Credit  0.002 0.001  0.008 0.003 
  (0.0020) (0.0019)  (0.0101) (0.0107) 
Low Income Tax Credit  0.189***  0.167***  1.229***  1.205*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0684)  (0.3365) (0.3644) 
Income x Income Tax Credit  -0.002***  -0.001**  -0.006**  -0.005** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Income x Low Income Tax Credit  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.012***  -0.014*** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Unemployment  Benefits  -0.034 -0.056  -0.137 -0.223 
(=1 if Yes)  (0.0449) (0.0441)  (0.2164) (0.2203) 
Unemployment  Benefits  Received  0.077*** 0.084***  0.334*** 0.381*** 
(Lagged 2 Periods)  (0.0211) (0.0207)  (0.1011) (0.1043) 
Age 0.003**  0.002  0.023***  0.020*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0017)  (0.0084) (0.0086) 
Sex  -0.176*** -0.171***  -0.851*** -0.807*** 
  (0.0432) (0.0413)  (0.2069) (0.2036) 
χ
2  146.42 156.80  142.57 150.00 
(p-value)    (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N  3980 3980  3980 3980 
Notes: The dependent variable is Form Filed (=1 if Yes) and Form Bought (=1 if Yes).  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses unless otherwise noted.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Confidence in the internal validity of the data, and therefore the results, is provided by 
the correspondence of remaining estimates with a priori expectations established in the literature.    24
Our results show that the likelihood of purchasing a tax form is negatively related to the price of 
the form, and that the level of earned income is positively related to participation.
26  Recalling 
that the probability of an audit is predicted to matter, our estimates show that changes in the audit 
probability have no significant effect on participation.
27  Finally, the coefficients on the age and 
sex variables are consistent with much of the past work in this area. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Encouraging filing has important policy implications.  Fiscally induced allocation of 
effort leads to inefficiencies arising from resource misallocation, and tax evasion via the non-
filing by ghosts also leads to misallocation through the relative payoffs between official (taxed) 
and unofficial (untaxed) activity.  Non-filing also generates inequities due to differential 
treatment of those who file and those who do not.  There is, finally and obviously, a revenue loss 
from non-filing.  Our experimental results indicate several promising strategies for encouraging 
greater filing rates.  In particular, our aggregate and econometric results indicate that an 
untargeted tax credit does not influence participation.  However, if the credit is targeted to low 
income earners, it does have the potential to increase filing.  The provision of a social safety net 
via unemployment benefits also has a positive, albeit indirect, impact on participation.  These 




                                                 
26 We do not include the price of the tax form in the filing models, under the presumption the filing decision is made 
after the purchase decision.  Given that the decisions may not be independent, we also estimate the filing models that 
include the price of the form, and find no significant difference in our results. 
27 This is likely due to the small range of audit probabilities used in our experimental design.   25
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Appendix A – Screen Images 
 
Figure A-1: Income Earning Task Screen 
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Figure A-2: Income and Tax Policy Screen 
 
 
Figure A-3: Confirm Buy Tax Form Screen 
 
 
Note that the cost is an experimental parameter.   30
Figure A-4: Tax Form Screen – Deductions and No Tax Credit 
   31
Figure A-5: Screen if Individual is Unemployed 
 